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Abstract: Our modern society comes to depend on 
large-scale supply chain networks to deliver 
resources to our homes and business in an efficient 
manner. However, there have been numerous 
examples where a local disturbance has led to the 
global failure of systems in recent years. Many 
researchers attempting to improve the resilience of 
logistics distribution systems to reduce the 
occurrence probability of its internal and external 
risks. The resilience of the medical device 
distribution networks is concerned with how to 
select distribution centers from a potential set so 
that the total cost is minimized and the resilience is 
maximized. In the paper, an optimization model for 
a resilient medical devices distribution network is 
proposed based on node failure probability, node 
failure costs and other factors. Furthermore, the 
validity and feasibility of the model is explained 
with an example. 
Keywords — Medical Device, Resilience, Distribution 
Center, Node Failure 
1. Introduction 
Supply chain networks play a very important role in 
modern society. However, with market demand 
uncertainty and the constant emergence of 
unconventional emergencies, the global supply chain 
network becomes more and more fragile. Furthermore, 
traditional lean supply chain management continuously 
pursues low cost and zero inventory, putting supply 
chain in extreme tension. Once a key supply network is 
broken by a serious failure or terrorist attack, it is 
difficult to recover in a short time, supply costs rise 
sharply, and customer service levels decrease greatly. 
Therefore, it is important to construct resilient supply 
chain network with high level of self-recovery and 
improved the ability to recover normal supply chain 
operations when node failure risk occurs. 
Resilience engineering, which has been widely 
researched [1-3], is an efficient way to analyze the 
security and stability of various complex systems [4]. In 
a supply chain network, the resilience can be understood 
as the ability to quickly recover and return to a stable 
state following a failure. A resilient supply chain 
network could reduce the probability of occurrence of its 
internal and external risks through its own pre-designed 
structure. Rosenkrantz et al. [5] proposed the concept of 
“structure-based resilience metrics” to quantify the 
resilience of nodes and edges in networks. Asha and 
Newth [6] proposed an evolutionary algorithm to evolve 
complex networks that are resilient to such cascading 
failure. Iakovou et al. [7] provided an up-to-date 
taxonomy of the risks that supply chains were exposed to 
along with the appropriate solutions that can be 
employed to improve their resiliency. Ratick et al. [8] 
used set cover location modeling as a method to 
determine the number of backup facilities to locate under 
varying cover, anticover, and complementary anticover 
distances. The model was applied to an example data set 
over 900 cities and towns in New England and New 
York. Wang et al. [9] developed a model based on the 
resilience evaluation approach to optimize the structure 
design of logistics networks. The evaluation criteria 
included the redundant resources, distributed suppliers 
and reachable delivery. Numerical examples have shown 
the efficiency and applicability of this model. Reed et al. 
[10] outlined a method to characterize the behavior of 
networked infrastructure for natural disaster events such 
as hurricanes and earthquakes. The method included 
resilience and interdependency measures. Furthermore, 
they also provided a brief calculation example using 
power delivery and telecommunications data collected 
post-landfall for Hurricane Katrina. Yan et al. [11] 
studied the emergency dispatch problem both when the 
network operates well and when one of the nodes fail, 
and developed an optimal model to minimize the total 
cost under the constraints of limited resources. Pettit et al. 
[12] proposed a conceptual framework to define 
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resilience in terms of measurable variables. 
Gunasekarana et al. [13] developed a framework based 
on key factors/enablers that determine the resilience and 
competitiveness of small- or medium-sized enterprises. 
Cabral et al. [14] proposed an integrated LARG analytic 
network process (ANP) method to structure the lean, 
agile, flexible and green decision model of supply chains. 
Klibi et al. [15] developed various modeling approaches 
to design resilient supply networks for the location–
transportation problem under uncertainty. 
In the literatures referenced above, most of the 
researches examine the resilience of supply chains from 
a qualitative point of view, but there is hardly a structure 
design to research supply chain network resilience from 
a quantitative point of view. This paper utilizes the 
medical device supply chain as the background, and 
proposes an optimization model for a resilient medical 
devices distribution network based on the characteristics 
of the medical device distribution network and node 
failure probability. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: 
section 2 introduces the characteristics of medical device 
supply chain network; the optimization model of resilient 
medical device distribution network is proposed in 
section 3; the simulation and experimental results are 
presented in section 4; the conclusion and further 
remarks are provided in section 5. 
2. The Medical Device Supply Chain Network 
The medical device is a special medical product that is 
affected by several factors, including governmental rules 
and regulations and lean management. In the medical 
device supply chain distribution network, a supply 
disruption caused by network node failures could lead to 
incalculable consequences for ill patients. Therefore, this 
paper structures the resilient medical device distribution 
network, to reduce the losses and negative effects caused 
by network node failures. 
2.1 The characteristics of the medical device 
supply chain network 
In this subsection, the characteristics of a medical device 
supply chain network will be described. In comparison to 
ordinary consumer goods, the medical device 
distribution network has less hierarchy, high network 
resilience and high failure cost. 
(1) Less network hierarchy 
In the medical device distribution network, the quantity 
and types of products sold through retailers are few, and 
most medical devices are directly sold through hospitals. 
In contrast to medicine supply chain distribution, the 
medical device distribution network generally does not 
include wholesalers. Therefore, the hierarchy of the 
medical device supply chain distribution network is 
flatter, with mostly secondary networks. 
(2) High network risk  
Medical devices directly act on the human body, relate to 
people’s health and safety, and typically require that 
their production conditions, transport apparatus and 
storage environment are germ-free and have consistent 
temperature and humidity. They also have more rigorous 
safety requirements for their transport, dispatching and 
storage. Compared with other devices, the network risk 
is greater.  
In addition, medical devices have strict requirements for 
the specifications and types of products in use. Thus, 
product specificity is strong and substitutability is poor, 
and if the supply is disrupted, then it is difficult to find 
substitute products in a short time. Moreover, medical 
device are also strictly regulated by the Food and Drug 
Administration, the department of Health and other 
departments, and the rules and regulations require both 
the manufacturers of medical devices and the suppliers 
of the manufacturers to apply for approval. This 
approval process further increases the difficulties that the 
distribution network may face in utilizing outside 
resources when node failure occurs. Therefore, in 
comparison with other commodities, medical devices 
have a higher need for resilience. 
(3) High failure cost 
Medical devices are the important for people’s health, 
and they have important influence on people’s daily lives. 
When an external shock results in a supply disruption, 
this could cause patients’ illness to become more serious, 
it could lead to death, bring incalculable losses, damage 
a government’s reputation and international image, and 
be quite unfavorable to social stability. Therefore, the 
impact of a medical device distribution network failure is 
far greater than other ordinary consumer goods. 
2.2 The resilience factors of the medical device 
distribution network 
Distribution network resilience is generally influenced by 
several factors including risk management ability, 
network structure, information platform and 
governmental rules and regulations and so on. Network 
structure is the precondition for the existence of the 
medical device supply chain distribution network, it is 
the important material basis and physical support for the 
delivery flow of goods, information and fund, and it also 
plays the basic and decisive role in the distribution 
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network resilience. In the paper, we will try to improve 
the network resilience through the improvement of the 
medical device distribution network structure. 
The resilience of a medical device distribution network 
is mainly influenced by the two factors of resilience 
investment cost and node failure cost, as shown Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. The resilience factors of medical device distribution network 
The resilience investment cost is the cost of various 
measures taken to improve network resilience, such as 
the fixed investment expenses for newly established 
distribution centers and the storage cost caused by 
increasing inventory reserves. The resilience investment 
has direct influence on distribution network resilience; 
the more the resilience investment cost, the better the 
distribution network resilience. However, determining 
how to rationally assign the limited resources to 
maximize the improvement of network resilience under 
the constraint of the fixed resilience investment cost is 
particularly important. 
Node failure cost is also called penalty cost, and it 
mainly includes customers’ losses caused by failures and 
the transport expense resulting from interval allocation 
conducted when failure occurs. The whole failure cost of 
a distribution network directly relates to the node failure 
probability of the network; the lower the node failure 
probability, the better the network resilience. 
3. Problem Model 
3.1 Model assumption 
(1) The fixed cost and unit operational cost of each 
candidate distribution centers are known.  
(2) The failure probability of each candidate distribution 
center is known. 
(3) If the distribution center does not fail, then each 
demand point should be supplied by one distribution 
center, and the demand quantity of each demand 
point is known. 
(4) The unit transport rates from each manufacturer to 
the distribution center and from the distribution 
center to the demand point are known. 
(5) The maximum capacity of the manufacturer and the 
maximum storage capacity of each distribution 
center are known. 
(6) Under the condition of failure, each demand point 
has a resilience allocation from at least one 
distribution center. 
(7) When failure occurs, the distribution center that 
supplies the resilience allocation for the demand 
point does not fail. 
(8) When failure occurs, network has only single point 
failure. 
3.2 Variable explanations 
c : Unit product penalty cost caused by failure; mainly 
includes product shortage cost and social impact cost;  
1(1, 2, )I n= L  : Collection of manufacturers;  
2(1, 2, , )J n= L : Collection of candidate distribution 
centers;  
3(1, 2, , )K n= L : Collection of demand points, 
including hospitals, retailers, etc.; 
kq : Annual demand of demand point k;  
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jkq : Supply quantity of distribution center j to demand 
point k; 
ijd : Transport distance from manufacturer i to candidate 
distribution center j; 
ijw : Transport quantity from manufacturer i to 
distribution center j; 
jkd : Transport distance from distribution center j to 
demand point k; 
jf : The fixed investment cost for selection of candidate 
distribution center j, including the expenses needed for a 
one-time investment for a newly established warehouse, 
purchase of equipments, etc.;  
jo : Unit operational expenses of candidate distribution 
center j; 
ijc : Unit transport fee from manufacturer i to candidate 
distribution center j; 
jkc : Unit transport fee from distribution center j to 
demand point k; 
jp : The failure probability of candidate distribution 
center j;  
jα : The influencing factors of candidate distribution 
center j for network failure cost;  
ijI : The resilience allocation quantity supplied by 
manufacturer i to distribution center j; 
jI : Resilience reserve quantity of distribution center j; 
jh : Unit storage expenses of candidate distribution 
center j; 
jkO : When the node fails, the resilience allocation 
quantity supplied by distribution center j to demand 
point k; 
iL : The maximum capacity of manufacturer i; 
jR : The maximum treatment capacity of distribution 
center j; 
*T : Resilience cost investment constraint;  
jx : 0, 1 variable expressing whether distribution center 
should be established at place j under the condition that 
the node does not fail. If established, then the value of is 
1, otherwise it is 0;  
ijy0 : 0, 1 variable expressing whether the reserve supply 
of candidate distribution center j is provided by 
manufacturer i. If yes, then the value is 1, and otherwise 
it is 0;  
jky1 : 0, 1 variable expressing whether the node does not 
fail if demand point k is assigned to candidate 
distribution center j. If yes, then the value is 1, and 
otherwise it is 0; 
jky2 : 0, 1 variable expressing whether the node does not 
fail if demand point k receives resilience demand 
allocation from candidate distribution center j. If yes, 
then the value is 1, and otherwise it is 0. 
3.3 Problem model 
1 1 1 1
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In the above formulation, the objective function Eq. (1) 
represents the total cost. There are three aspects: (1) The 
normal operational cost of the medical device 
distribution network, which mainly includes transport 
expense, the fixed investment expense and operational 
expense of the distribution center; (2) The resilience cost 
caused by the resilience measures taken, including the 
establishment of resilience for the demand point and the 
distribution center interval emergency allocation when 
node fails. In the paper, the resilience cost mainly 
includes the inward transport cost, operational cost and 
inventory cost caused by the distribution center 
increasing goods reserves; (3) The failure cost caused by 
the factors of transport cost and sales losses resulting 
from interval allocation when the node fails.  
Constraint Eq. (2) is the resilience investment constraint. 
Constraint Eq. (3) represents the unique assignment of a 
distribution center to a demand customer. Constraints Eq. 
(4)-(6) represent that the distribution center can service 
the demand customer only when the distribution center 
has been established. Constraints Eq. (7)-(8) are the 
capacity constraints for distribution center and the 
manufacturer, respectively. Constraints Eq. (9)-(10) 
represent the balance of supply and demand when the 
node does not fail. Constraint Eq. (11) represents 
dispatching constraints when the distribution network 
node fails. Constraints Eq. (12)-(13) represent that the 
distribution center could not provide the resilience 
allocation to any demand customer if the distribution 
center is selected. Constraints Eq. (14)-(21) express the 
balance constraints of resilience allocation. Constraint 
Eq. (22) imposes the integrality restriction on the 
decision variables 0 1 2, , ,j ij jk jkx y y y . Constraint Eq. (23) 
imposes the non-negativity restriction on decision 
variables , , , ,ij jk j ij jkw q I I O . 
4. Numerical Examples 
4.1 The example description 
This section will give an example to show the application 
of the model. Suppose a large medical device 
manufacturer annually produces 3.50 million boxes 
medical device, and the market price of each box is 800 
RMB. To meet the demand of the 39 market warehouses 
1k - 39k , the manufacturer plans to select and establish 
regional warehouses among 11 candidate regional 
warehouses in China. Meanwhile, to improve the 
distribution network resilience, the manufacturer prepare 
to invest 10 million RMB in resilience costs and 
confirms the resilience reserves and resilience 
dispatching plan of each regional warehouse in the event 
that the node fails. Each candidate regional warehouse’s 
fixed construction expenses, unit operational expenses, 
maximum capacity, unit reserve cost, and failure 
probability are known, as shown in Table 1. The 
transport distance, unit transport rate and the influencing 
factor of each candidate regional warehouse are shown in 
Table 2.  
4.2 Results analysis 
The distribution network resilience model is the mixed-
integer linear programming model. In the paper, we will 
use Lingo to solve the model. The corresponding results 
are shown in Table 3. 
Table 1. Candidate regional warehouse’s construction expenses, failure probability and unit operational expenses 
Int. J Sup. Chain. Mgt  Vol. 3, No. 3, September 2014 
 
118 
Candidate 
regional 
warehouse 
Failure  
probability 
Fixed cost 
(10 thousand 
RMB) 
Unit operational 
expenses 
(RMB/Box) 
Maximum capacity 
(10 thousand boxes) 
Unit inventory 
expenses 
(RMB/Box) 
J1 0.20 270 1.24 54 0.21 
J2 0.25 80 1.32 46.1 0.22 
J3 0.31 120 1.5 32 0.25 
J4 0.22 220 4.1 58 0.68 
J5 0.28 70 2.03 46 0.34 
J6 0.25 170 2.41 52 0.40 
J7 0.26 90 2.37 49 0.40 
J8 0.24 100 2.88 32 0.48 
J9 0.30 150 3.05 36 0.51 
J10 0.25 90 0.38 50 0.06 
J11 0.27 60 1.2 38 0.20 
Table 2. Transport distance, transport rate and influencing factor 
Candidate 
regional 
warehouse 
jα  
Production area 
Transport rate 
(RMB/Box/km) 
Transport distance 
(km) 
J1 1.0522 0.0030 950 
J2 1.0894 0.0036 1565 
J3 1.0560 0.0036 896 
J4 1.0833 0.0028 1055 
J5 1.1412 0.0045 1462 
J6 1.1985 0.0036 2446 
J7 1.1354 0.0036 2498 
J8 1.0729 0.0036 1580 
J9 1.0669 0.0036 823 
J10 1.0948 0.0036 549 
J11 1.1268 0.0036 1075 
   Table 3. Site selection and each warehouse’s resilience reserves 
jJ  jI  Covering range 
J1 1396 
k3(36343), k4(40595), k5(44191), k8(69218), k10(70943), k11(49378), k12(827), 
k13(30834), k14(14072), k15(19798), k20(14062), k24(66790), k28(3302), 
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k31(2202), k36(23313), k39(52736) 
J2 293777 k6(96994), k7(46763), k29(8464), k30(15002) 
J4 3991 
k2(8778), k16(85568), k17(57905), k18(60977), K19(50418), k21(5661), k22(5071), 
k23(102956), k25(6928), k26(42265), k34(37505), k35(38025), k37(23180), 
k38(50772) 
J8 5402 k1(148322), k9(56718), k27(48971), k32(4953), k33((55634) 
 
From Table 3, it is clear that four regional distribution 
centers are selected, namely J1, J2, J4 and J8. In the paper, 
jI  indicates the resilience reserves of each regional 
warehouse. For example, the reserves value 4I  of 
regional warehouse 4J  is 3991; the covering range is the 
number of the market warehouse covered by the regional 
warehouse, figures in brackets show the supply quantity 
supplied by the regional warehouse to the market 
warehouse under normal conditions. For instance, for 
regional warehouse J8, the covered market warehouses 
are K1, K9, K27, K32 and K33, and the supply quantity are 
148322, 56718, 48971, 4953 and 55634, respectively. 
Furthermore, the normal supply quantities, resilience 
reserves and allocation plans of the regional warehouse 
are shown in Table 4. 
Table 4. Regional warehouse’s normal supply quantity, 
resilience reserves and allocation 
),( ji  ijW  jI  jkO  
J1 538604 1396 k1(1396) 
J2 167223 293777 
K2 (8788), k3 
(27833), k5 (44191), 
k6 (96994), k7 
(46763),  k8 (69218) 
J4 576009 3991 k16(3991) 
J8 314598 5402 K33(5402) 
From Table 4, it is clear that the network could only meet 
the demand of some market demand customers under the 
constraint of resilience cost. If the resilience cost is 
increased, it could meet the demand of more demand 
customers. 
5. Conclusions 
Rising volatility and uncertainty in global supply chains is 
causing traditional supply chain management models to 
break down. The resilience of SCM is one of the most 
important factors when node failure risk occurs, and has 
been extensively researched in recent years. Medical 
devices are indispensable, and constructing a distribution 
network with resilience is important to improve medical 
device distribution and protect people’s lives and health.  
In this paper, we first analyzed the main characteristics of 
the medical device distribution network and generalize 
the corresponding resilience factors. Then, we proposed a 
distribution network resilience model based on the node 
failure probability, node failure costs and other factors. 
Finally, the simulation and experimental results 
demonstrated the validity and feasibility of the model. 
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